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As many of  you know, John Locke seemed to be much troubled by 
something which he called enthusiasm. He devotes chapter XIX of  book 
4 of  the Essay to his animadversions against it. And in this paper I 
hope to consider some of  his views. But this is not primarily a histori- 
cal study. We can take Locke and his troubles as a convenient starting 
point for our own reflections on the topic which so interested him. 
Who are the enthusiasts? Locke, I suppose, may have sometimes 
gotten enthusiastic himself about something, in the modern sense of  
"enthusiasm." But o f  course it is enthusiasm in a somewhat different, 
though not unrelated, sense which roused the ire in his soul. Philolo- 
gists tell us that the thus in enthusiast is derived from the Greek word 
for God, theos. And the en means in. It looks as though, etymological- 
ly, an enthusiast is either a person who is in God, or else one in whom 
God is. 
Locke himself characterizes the enthusiasts in various ways. Early on 
in the relevant: chapter he says that  some people "persuade themselves 
that they are under the peculiar guidance of  heaven in their actions 
and opinions, especially in those of  them which they cannot account 
for by the ordinary methods of  knowledge and principles of  reason. ''1 
And, he continues, they "have often flattered themselves with a persua- 
sion of  an immediate intercourse with the Deity and frequent commu- 
* This paper, here slightly revised, was delivered as the Presidential Address at the 
annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Religion, in Charleston, South 
Carolina, on 4 March 1988. It was written during my tenure of a fellowship in the 
Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame. 
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nications from the Divine Spirit."(82 5) And, apparently referring to 
this description, he says, "this I take to be properly enthusiasm."(82 7) 
This characterization is not  in ideal form for a definition, and it 
invites several distinctions. But it gives us a pret ty good idea of  the sort 
o f  people whom Locke had in mind. This type  is by no means restricted 
to Locke's time. It is common enough in our own, and we have our 
own familiarity with such people. If  Locke were to come to America 
now in the 1980s he would no doubt  quickly recognize Oral Roberts  
and J immy Bakker as enthusiasts of  the sort he castigated in 17th 
century England. A lot of  us, therefore, will have some "feel"  for the 
sort of  thing which troubled Locke, and some of  us will probably be 
inclined to go a long way with him in  his at tack upon enthusiasm. 
It would, however, be misleading to think of  contemporary enthusi- 
asm entirely in terms of  television preachers. It seems to me, for exam- 
ple, to be fairly common among the ordinary members of  the churches 
with which I am best acquainted, i.e., those which are sometimes called 
"evangelical" and those in the reformed tradition. It is perhaps less 
common among the ministers and theologians of  those groups than in 
the laity, but  it seems especially noticeable in the missionary contin- 
gent. 
For  this occasion however, when we meet  in a philosophical ambi- 
ence, let me cite a 20th century Christian philosopher. This is an auto- 
biographical passage taken from John Baillie's Our Knowledge o f  God: 3 
What I must do is to ask myself  how the knowledge of  God first 
came to me ....  
It was, then, through the media of  my boyhood ' s  home, the Chris- 
tian communi ty  of  which if formed a part, and the 'old, old story'  
from which that communi ty  drew its life, that God first revealed 
Himself to me. This is simple matter  of  fact. But what I take to be 
matter  o f  fact in it is not only that God used these media but  that in 
using them He actually did reveal Gimself to my soul ... .  
That God should have revealed Himself to certain men of  long ago 
could not in itself be of  concern to me now; first, because, not being 
myself  privy to this revelation, I could never know for sure whether 
it were a real or only an imagined one; second, because mere hear- 
say could never be a sufficient foundation for such a thing as reli- 
gion, though it might be well enough as a foundation for certain 
other kinds of  knowledge; and third, because the revelation would 
necessarily lack the particular authorization and relevance to my 
case which alone could give it power over my recalcitrant will. 
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What is it to me that God should have commanded David to do this 
or that, or called Paul to such and such a task? It is nothing at all, 
unless it should happen that, as I read o f  His calling and commanding 
them, I at the same time found Him calling and commanding me. 
If  the word of  God is to concern me, it must be a word addressed to 
me individually and to the particular concrete situation in which I 
am standing now. 
So far the test imony of  John Baillie. It too  is a version o f  enthusiasm, 
as I understand it. 
Now, the fact that enthusiasm was endemic in his own time raised 
Locke's  hackles, but  the fact that it was not  idiosyncratic to his time 
gave him a different sort o f  problem. And this is a problem which some 
of  us, though only some, will share with him. For  enthusiasm not only 
long outlived Locke, it also long antedated him. It is deeply embedded 
- I would say irremediably embedded - in several religious traditions, 
including the one to which Locke himself  gave allegiance, Le., Chris- 
tianity. For almost all o f  the principal figures associated with the be- 
ginnings of  Christianity, and many of  the major figures in the long 
history o f  Judasim which preceded Christianity, are plainly represented 
in the canonical literature as being enthusiasts. Christianity may wear 
the cloak o f  reasonable respectability, but  at home that cloak must 
hang beside a skeleton in the closet. 
Who, for example, is more clearly an enthusiast than the biblical 
Joseph, a man who all his life interpreted dreams - his own and those 
of  other  people - as divine communications? Locke speaks, as we have 
just heard, o f  people who "persuade themselves that they are under 
the peculiar guidance of  heaven in their actions and opinions, especially 
in those of  them which they cannot account for by the ordinary meth- 
ods of  knowledge and principles of  reason." Could he cite a more 
dramatic illustration than the case of  Abraham, going to Mount Moriah 
to sacrifice his son Isaac? And what o f  Moses, who heard the divine 
voice emanating from a burning bush, and who climbed Mount Sinai 
to receive the divine law from the hand o f  God? Or think of  the great 
prophets of  Israel, such as Isaiah, seeing visions of  the divine majesty 
in the smoke filled sanctuary of  the temple, or Ezekiel, who apparently 
converted a thunderstorm into a vision o f  God's throne and chariot? 
We can come down to New Testament times. There is Paul, mis- 
sionary to a fourth of  the Mediterranean world and writer o f  half 
o f  the New Testament. He is converted, so we are told, by a divine 
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voice speaking from the heavens, while he lies on the ground, stricken 
temporarily blind by a celestial light. He is commissioned for his evan- 
gelistic endeavors by a divine inspiration that falls upon the church of 
which he is a member. He receives God's own guidance for his journey 
in the form of a night vision. And he does not hesitate to construe his 
own preaching as the Word of God. 
But of course it is not Paul only. Before the birth of Jesus, Mary 
speaks with an archangel. The father of John the Baptist sees a vision 
in the temple, and is left speechless until the birth of his son. And, 
after Jesus is born, Joseph and Mary are divinely warned to escape 
into Egypt with their baby. 
After the crucifixion of Jesus, Peter and the other disciples are 
filled with a divine inspiration which enabled them to preach in foreign 
languages, the celebrated "speaking in tongues." Peter is rescued from 
prison by an angel, and rebuked for his excessive ethno-centrism by a 
vision which he saw while meditating (or sleeping?) on a rooftop. 
Stephen shouts that he sees heaven opened, and Jesus at the right 
hand of God. And John the apocalyptist reports the bizarre and com- 
plex series of visions which now form the bulk of the book of Revela- 
tion. 
And then, of  course, there is Jesus himself. His baptism is acknowl- 
edged by a divine approbation, sounding from the sky. On the Mount 
of the Transfiguration he converses, in the first century A.D., with 
Moses and Elijah, who appear there in visible form. He declares himself 
to have a special divine commission in the world, and claims the author- 
ity of God for his actions. And he is represented as repeatedly per- 
forming miracles - walking on the water, feeding the multitudes, 
healing the sick, and even raising the dead. Sometimes a television 
evangelist may seem bent on rivalling Jesus in such exploits. But it 
would not be all that easy to surpass, in this respect, the picture given 
of him in the New Testament. 3 
Now, there is in all this a certain cause of embarrassment, though, 
as I say, not everyone would be embarrassed by it. A thoroughgoing 
atheist or secularist need not be disturbed by these similarities at all. 
He would be more likely to welcome them. He would say, I suppose, 
that all of these people - Jimmy Bakker, John of the Apocalypse, 
Peter, Moses, Abraham, Oral Roberts, and all the rest of them - be- 
long in essentially the same bag. They are either cynical charlatans, 
preying on the religious sensibilities and credulities of simple people, 
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or else they are themselves superstitious fools. In either case they traffic 
in religious delusion, imposing it either on themselves or on others by 
ignoring the claims of  sober reason. That we can find such a constancy 
o f  enthusiastic phenomena across more than four thousand years, from 
ancient Canaan and Egypt to contemporary America and Korea, shows 
how deeply rooted in human nature is the weakness to which religious 
delusion appeals. And across that whole spectrum the thoroughgoing 
atheist will no doubt  be willing to apply Locke's  critical strictures. 
Atheists, therefore, can have a fairly easy way with enthusiasm. 
That way, however, is not  readily available to Locke - nor to those 
who, like him, profess some allegiance to Christianity. Such people 
might perhaps reject one or another of  the enthusiasts who belong to 
the history of  Christianity, but I suppose that it would be hard for 
them to turn their backs on a / / o f  them and still to keep a straight face 
in church. Anyway,  I could not do it. So Locke has a problem, and to 
some extent  I share it with him. 
Now, some medievals are supposed to have advised having recourse 
to a distinction as the strategy o f  choice in dealing with philosophical 
problems. No doubt  some distinctions would be helpful here, and one 
o f  them, at least, is suggested by Locke himself. I think that there is 
not  a single instance in which Locke specifically identifies something 
as enthusiasm and then says something good about  it. Instead he says 
that enthusiasm substitutes for both  faith and reason " the ungrounded 
fancies of  a man's own brain."(82 3) Enthusiasts "pretend to revelation, 
and ... persuade themselves that they are under the peculiar guidance 
of  heaven."( 82 5) They "have often flattered themselves with a persua- 
sion of  an immediate intercourse with the Dei ty"( 82  5), and "whatever 
groundless opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their fancies 
is an illumination from the Spirit o f  G o d . " (  8 2  "This I take to be 
properly enthusiasm," he says, "which ... founded neither on reason 
nor divine revelation [rises] from the conceits o f  a warmed or over- 
weening brain. (4 7) 4 
Locke also recognizes, however, that there is such a thing as a gen- 
uine divine revelation (4 11), and even claims that there are proofs 
that there have been such revelations. He cites Moses and Gideon 
specifically as men who really did have a special commission from 
God to perform great works.( 82 15) And he assures us that he is "far 
from denying that God can or doth sometimes enlighten men's minds 
in the apprehending of  certain truths, or excite them to good ac t ions  
.. ."(82 16) s 
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Perhaps, therefore, I was not  being entirely faithful to Locke's own 
terminology in my early characterization o f  enthusiasm. For  it looks 
as though he uses this word to apply only to the counterfeit  or decep- 
tive copy of  something which has genuine and reputable instances, 
while using other  terms, such as "revelation," to refer to the genuine 
article. He must acknowledge that the people whom he castigates are 
similar to Moses and Gideon, but  he must also distinguish them. And, 
as I said earlier, any Christian thinker who is at all sensitive to the 
history of  her religion must do something similar. 
Here I adopt  a convention somewhat  different from Locke's, a con- 
vention which represents both  the similarity and the intended differ- 
ence. I will say that someone is a genuine enthusiast, and practices 
genuine enthusiasm, if she is in actual fact the recipient of  a divine 
guidance or communication,  or is someone who experiences a special 
manifestation of  the divine presence. And someone is a spurious en- 
thusiast if he is either convinced that he has such a divine grace, or he 
pretends to have it, when in fact he does not  have it. 
This distinction does not  rest on a difference in the claims made by  
such people, for they may make very similar claims. Nor need it reflect 
any phenomenological or psychological difference. The distinction is 
not, for example, a matter  o f  depth o f  conviction, or o f  sincerity. It 
appeals instead to a difference in what is going on in some sense outside 
the apparent enthusiast. Is it, or is it not, really God who thus inspires 
her? That is the question on which this distinction depends. 
No doubt  this distinction raises the problem of  how one might an- 
swer this question in some particular case. That is, o f  course, an impor- 
tant problem, one of  the most  important  ones. This distinction provides 
one way of  formulating it. But the distinction does not  itself tell us 
how to go about  solving it. Whatever I can say about  that must come a 
little later. 
The distinction itself is, o f  course, not  a new one. It is made in the 
biblical texts themselves in the contrast between the true prophets 
and the false or  lying prophets. And many later Christian writers 
- some of  the mystics, for example - are much concerned with dis- 
tinguishing genuine divine visitations from demonic counterfeits and 
other misapprehensions. One can think here of  St. John of  the Cross 
and St. Teresa of  Avila, both of  whom I will soon mention again. 6 
And since these people are concerned with this distinction, they are 
also concerned with the question to which it naturally gives rise. 
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There is another distinction which will be useful. I will distinguish 
between theoretical enthusiasm and practical enthusiasm. A theoretical 
enthusiast is someone who undertakes to defend the practice of  (gen- 
uine) enthusiasm. And the practical enthusiast is one who, either 
genuinely or  spuriously, is involved in instances of  enthusiasm. There 
is nothing, o f  course, to prevent a person from being both  a theoretical 
and a practical enthusiast. No doubt  there are many such people, and 
I would take John Baillie to be one of  them. But a theoretical enthusi- 
ast need not  be a practical enthusiast. I think, for example, o f  C.D. 
Broad, who introduced his defense of  the validity o f  mystical experi- 
ence with the observation that he was himself entirely devoid o f  such 
experience. 7 And, on the other  side, the biblical texts - both  the 
Hebrew and the Christian scriptures - seem to be full o f  accounts of  
people who were practical enthusiasts but  who made no at tempt to 
defend that practice. 
Locke, I think, does not  discuss theoretical enthusiasm. He is him- 
self, o f  course, a sort o f  limited theoretical enthusiast in my  sense, 
since he defends the validity and propriety o f  the biblical examples. 
That he also castigates enthusiasm is, o f  course, another version of  the 
problem which this phenomenon generates for him. 
Well, let us not  postpone the interesting and controversial questions 
any longer. What shall we do about  enthusiasm, and on what basis 
shall we do it? What response shall we make to Oral Roberts  - or, 
for that matter,  to Paul the apostle? There is a simple and easy answer 
to these questions. We should accept and act on genuine enthusiasm 
and reject spurious enthusiasm. It would seem, after all, that God is 
very likely to be telling the truth and commanding what is good. But 
of  course this sort of  answer is likely to seem unsatisfying, because it 
does not  tell us just how to determine which enthusiasm to accept and 
which to reject. 
There is, however, an interesting alternative to this easy answer. 
And that is that we should do nothing at all about  enthusiasm, not  
even about  genuine enthusiasm. This suggestion seems to me to be 
made, at least in certain moods,  by one of  the great Spanish mystical 
writers o f  the sixteenth century, St. John of  the Cross. He says, for 
example, "when it is a question of  imaginary visions, or other  super- 
natural apprehensions, which can enter the senses without  the co- 
operation o f  man's free will, I say that at no time and season must 
it receive them, whether  the soul be in a state o f  perfection, or whether 
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in a state less perfect - not  even though they come from God. ''8 In 
the next  chapter he says, '"Let us speak of  the confessor who, whether 
or no he be inclined toward these things, has not  the prudence that 
he ought to have in disencumbering the soul and detaching the desire 
of  his disciple from them, but  begins to speak to him about  these 
visions and devotes the greater part of  his spiritual conversation to 
them, as we have said, giving him signs by which he may distinguish 
good visions from evil. Now, although it is well to know this, there 
is no reason to cause the soul this labour, anxiety and peril. By paying 
no heed to visions, and refusing to receive them, all this is prevented, 
and the soul acts as it should. ''9 And later on he repeats this advice 
at greater length, l~ 
Now, I say that John puts forward this view "in some moods ."  
That is because there are some other  passages in which he seems to take 
not  so hard a line. Maybe he is somewhat  ambivalent, or maybe I have 
not  worked out  fully his doctrine. 11 But at any rate, there is this 
theme in John of  the Cross, and we can use it regardless of  whether it 
is his full account of  the matter. As I understand the general thrust of  
his reasoning about  this, he holds that while there is a real distinction 
between genuine and spurious experiences it is hard to distinguish them 
in actual practice, and a person who tries to do that is almost sure to 
make mistakes. Furthermore,  even the genuine experiences are often 
obscure and are likely to be misinterpreted. On the other hand, the 
genuine experiences will produce their good effects in our souls even 
if we pay no attention to them, and the counterfeits will do us no harm 
if we ignore them. And so it is much wiser that a person act on none 
of  them at all. 
A person who followed this theme in John's  instruction might be 
called a non-responsive enthusiast. Such a person would simply ignore 
his own enthusiastic experiences. He would not  preach his apparent 
revelations, he would not undertake to obey the apparently divine 
commands,  and so on. The enthusiasm might be in him, but  there 
would be no response to it. 
Are there any non-responsive enthusiasts? I don' t  know. The en- 
thusiasts we know about  - Abraham and John of  the Apocalypse and 
Oral Roberts,  for example - are not  o f  this variety. But that is, in large 
part, just  why we know about  them. If there are any non-responsive 
enthusiasts we would be unlikely to identify them as enthusiasts at all, 
since they would presumably give no sign o f  it. And so there may be 
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such people, unknown to anyone except themselves and perhaps to 
some spiritual advisor. 
There is something attractive in the suggestion that non-responsive- 
ness is the right way to deal with enthusiasm, and I hope to make some 
use of it shortly. But is it not also incredible that it should represent 
the whole story about this problem? For one thing, if we apply it to 
the biblical period, it requires us to believe that almost all of the major 
figures in the beginnings of Christianity (and many of those in Judaism) 
regularly chose an unwise path. Even worse, I find it hard to believe 
that it could be spiritually preferable for a person to ignore what he 
deeply believes to be a divine command. Would it really have been 
better for Isaiah to ignore the divine commission as a prophet, or for 
Paul to remain at home despite his calling to be a missionary to the 
gentiles? Of course I don't really know what I would have done if I 
had been in Isaiah's shoes, but I can hardly imagine keeping a straight 
face while saying that I ought just to ignore the divine command. So 
I must look for something else. 
Something else - but what? How should I decide, for example, 
about Oral Roberts' recent claims in connection with his fund raising 
project? If I don't take up Locke's position, attributing Roberts' state- 
ments to a "warmed or overweening brain," must I acknowledge 
Roberts as a genuine prophet with a divine inspiration? No. So far as I 
can see, I need neither side with Locke nor  with Roberts. I said that I 
would look for something beyond John's advice. But this is not the 
situation in which I need it. For in the case of Oral Roberts and his 
claims the strategy of non-responsiveness seems plausible, at least to 
me. 
As I recall the Roberts case, he announced that God had told him to 
raise several million dollars for some religious project, and that if he 
did not succeed then God would "call him home." Roberts then under- 
took to raise this money. I guess he succeeded in that, and he is still 
with us. That seems a pretty straightforward example of enthusiasm, 
presumably either genuine or spurious. And Roberts, of course, acted 
on it. But why must I have an opinion about it? Why should I make 
any judgment here at all? 
Of course, I might have an opinion about it, and I might have that 
opinion on any one of several bases. I might, for example, have some 
previous opinion about Roberts' reliability, spirituality, honesty, or 
whatever, and then I might judge this case largely in terms of that 
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earlier judgment.  Or I might have some theological view about  whether 
God is likely to make such a demand as Roberts  reported. And so on. 
If I do make a judgment  about  Roberts '  claim on such a basis then I 
suppose that my judgment  will have a reliability commensurate with 
that o f  the basis, But also I might find myself  wi thout  any such basis, 
or at least without  any in which I had much confidence. And if so, 
then why should I have any opinion at all? 
Suppose that Oral Roberts  had made  a more prosaic and less theo- 
logical claim, saying that his wife had told him to bring home two 
quarts of  milk today,  and that she would bang him with a skillet if 
he did not. Did his wife really tell him that? Maybe, maybe not. Must 
I have an opinion about  that, too? Must I be able to determine whether 
he is telling the truth? How could I do that? I wasn't  there myself  at 
the alleged event, and maybe there were no other witnesses. I could 
ask Mrs. Roberts  herself. She might confirm her husband's account. 
Or she might deny it. But she might say it was none of  my business, 
and neither confirm nor deny it. And couldn' t  she be justified in that? 
The Roberts '  domestic life is not  obviously a proper concern of  mine, 
and Mrs. Roberts  is not  bound to assist me in my curiosity. So I might 
in face have no good way of  deciding about  the truth of  this claim. 
Now, my relation to Roberts '  actual claim seems, to me at least, 
to be very much l i k e m y  relation to this hypothetical  situation. I may 
not  have to do anything about  the Roberts  claim, and (perhaps largely 
for that reason) it may not  be any o f  my business. My interest in it, if 
I have an interest at all, is likely to be mostly a matter  of  curiosity. 
So it doesn' t  seem at all surprising that I might be at a loss as to how to 
get any further on it. 
Of  course, if I happen to be on Oral Roberts '  marling list I may 
have to decide whether to send him twenty dollars. But a decision 
about  that may well be largely independent o f  a decision about  the 
genuineness of  his enthusiasm. A genuine divine command to Roberts  
to raise several million dollars does not  by itself impose any obligation 
on me to contribute to that project - it is a divine instruction to 
Roberts, not to me. On the other  hand, the project for which Roberts  
is collecting the money may strike me as a good one, perhaps indeed 
just the sort of  project which I ought to support.  In that case it seems 
that I should write out  the check regardless of  whether I can come up 
with a definitive judgment  on the character of  Roberts '  enthusiasm. 12 
The crucial point here, it seems to me, is something like this. Many 
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cases of  enthusiasm will have the following feature. If  they really are 
what they p u r p o r t  to be - that is, genuine c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  from God 
- then it is unlikely that I will have any reliable way of  determining 
that t h e y  really are what they purport  to be. And so the fact, if it is a 
fact, that I cannot make that determination is not  a strong reason for 
supposing that they are not what they purport  to be. Of  course, it isn't 
a reason for thinking that they are genuine either. And so it is plausible 
for me simply to decline to have any opinion at all about  such cases. 
There isn't anything special about  me in this respect. I should sup- 
pose that for most  cases o f  enthusiasm, a n d  for most  observers, if the 
enthusiasm is genuine then it is very unlikely that those observers will 
be in any good posit ion to determine that it is genuine. 
There is a corollary o f  this observation. It is quite possible for an 
enthusiast herself to wonder  whether her own enthusiasm is genuine. 
(In fact, this is not  an uncommon concern among the classical mys- 
tics.) And an enthusiast may even have some reason, perhaps a strong 
reason, for thinking that her experience is not  genuine. But t he  fact 
that she cannot convince m e  that it is genuine is not, in general, a 
strong reason of  that sort. For  it will not  usually not  be the case that 
if it were genuine then she would probably be able to convince me o f  
that fact. 
But, someone may say, if I can't  determine whether a certain en- 
thusiasm is genuine, then what good is it? Well, John of  the Cross is a 
useful reminder that divine actions may have effects which are inde- 
pendent  o f  any determination I may make about  them. Perhaps the 
spiritual life is more than epistemology. But nevertheless it may be 
suggested that epistemology is something, even if it is not  everything, 
and a piece o f  enthusiasm whose genuineness I cannot determine is 
unlikely to be of  any direct  ep is temic  benefit to me. That is, I will 
not  learn from it an important  truth, nor will I receive from it a divine 
command for my life. And so there is at least one important  sort o f  
benefit  which it will not  confer on me. 
That suggestion seems plausible. I think that it (or perhaps some 
careful emendation of  it) is true. But I should also remember that I 
am not  the only person in the world. I need not  suppose that every 
divine communicat ion must be intended to benefit me. Not every 
divine revelation need be a revelation to me ,  and not  every divine com- 
mand is addressed to me. So a divine revelation may very well be an 
epistemic benefit to someone even if  I can make nothing o f  it at all. 
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This may suggest that if a genuine enthusiasm is to confer a direct 
epistemic benefit then there must be s o m e o n e  - though of  course it 
doesn't  have to be me - who is in a position to recognize it. That is 
probably not correct, at least in its full generality. But even so, I 
think that there are cases (and they are not  so very uncommon)  in 
which someone does recognize a genuine enthusiasm. And I suppose 
that  the person who is most likely to be in a position to do that is 
the enthusiast herself. For if the experience is genuine then it seems 
plausible to suppose that the person who has the experience is probably 
the person to whom that revelation is most directly addressed. She is 
the one of  whom it is most likely to be true that deciding about the 
genuineness of  the enthusiasm really is h e r  legitimate business. And 
how might that business be done? 
Locke is stuck with this question. He repeats over and over, though 
without  substantial argument, I think, that the enthusiasts of  his own 
time ignore reason, and thus have no way of  differentiating the genuine 
from the spurious. And he repeatedly seems to infer from this that 
therefore their enthusiasm must be spurious. But he wants to affirm 
that the revelatory experiences of  the biblical prophets were genuine, 
and that  they recognized them as such. So how did t h e y  do it? 
Well, Locke says that in such cases God "convinces us that it [i.e., 
revelation] is from him by some marks which reason cannot be mis- 
taken in. ''13 And he goes on to explain that "holy men of old ... had 
outward signs to convince them of  the author of  those revelations. ''14 
What outward signs? Locke here cites Moses, who (Locke says) saw a 
burning bush which was not  consumed by the flames, and whose rod 
was turned into a serpent. And he also cites Gideon, who, according 
to the biblical story, put  out the famous fleece to get a miraculous 
confirmation o f  his divine commission. And Locke also suggests that 
" the  prophets of  old" must all  have had similar miraculous evidence. Is 
Now a modern reader is likely to be struck by the apparent ease 
with which Locke became convinced that Moses, Gideon, and other 
prophets of  old saw miraculous signs. His argument requires that  these 
really were, and did not  merely appear to be, events of  such an extra- 
ordinary character that reason could not be mistaken about their sig- 
nificance. Not so very long after Locke, David Hume would be arguing 
that it was pret ty hard, to say the least, to have sufficient testimonial 
evidence that a miracle had occurred. 16 We need not  swallow Hume's 
argument hook, line, and sinker to have some sympathy for doubts 
183 
about the ease with which the occurrence of  ancient miracles might 
now be established by appeals to reason. One might indeed have the 
impression t h a t  Locke did not  inquire very deeply into the genesis 
and maintenance o f  his own belief that these miraculous events had 
really occurred. 17 
However that may be, there is another  problem here. Think of  the 
Gideon story, one which seems strikingly, even humorously,  true to 
life, at least in its psychological aspects. 18 An angel of  the Lord ap- 
pears to Gideon and commissions him to raise an army and drive out  
the rampaging Midianite invaders. The angel also produces a miraculous 
sign at Gideon's request, f ire springing u p  from a rock. So Gideon 
under took  some preliminary stept to carry out  his divine commission. 
But later on, before any decisive encounter  with the Midianites, it 
looks as though Gideon began to have doubts. And so Gideon prayed 
and asked God to give him a miraculous sign, a sheepskin wet with 
dew in the morning while the ground around it was dry. And in the 
morning the sign was there, just as Gideon asked. Okay~ But before 
t h e  day was out Gideon has doubts again. (Did he think of  the pos- 
sibility that it was just natural that dew collected more readily on a 
sheepskin than on the ground? I don' t  know.) So he asked God for 
the opposite sign the next  morning. And the next morning that sign 
was there. Finally Gideon has enough to sustain his confidence, and 
he began his march. 
I can take the story o f  Gideon seriously. And I think that it provides 
one answer - but not  the only possible answer - to the question we 
have been considering. A person could recognize an enthusiasm as 
genuine because it was confirmed by a divine sign, perhaps even a 
miracle. And indeed a person could iterate this confirmation, as Gideon 
did, seeking another  sign to confirm the first. I know, o f  course, that 
some people don' t  put much stock in the miraculous. But the question 
I am here considering does not arise with any real force unless we take 
a genuine revelation to be a live possibility. And if it is a live possibility, 
as it seems to me to be, then a miracle is also a live possibility. The 
Gideon story thus strikes me as true to life throughout,  and not  merely 
in its psychological aspects. 
But while this is one way in which a person might ecognize a genuine 
enthusiasm, it need not be the only way. Consider, for example, the 
following passage from the autobiography of  St. Teresa of  Avila, an- 
other Spanish mystic of  the 16th century.  It is part of  her reply to a 
confessor who raised some critical questions about her visionsJ 9 
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My confessor then asked me who told me it was Jesus Christ. 
"He often tells me so Himself", I replied; "but ,  before ever He told 
me so, the fact was impressed upon my understanding, and before 
that He used to tell me He was there when I could not  see Him." 
If I were blind, or in p i t ch  darkness, and a person whom I had never 
seen, but  only heard of, came and spoke to me and told me who he 
was, I should believe him, but  I could not  affirm that it was he as 
confidently as if I had seen him. But in this case I could certainly 
affirm it, for, though He remains unsee, so clear a knowledge is 
impressed  upon the soul that to doubt  it seems quite impossible. 
The Lord is p leased that this knowledge should be so deeply en- 
graven upon t h e  understanding that one can no more doubt  it than 
one can doubt  the ev idence  of  one's eyes - indeed, the latter is 
easier, for we sometimes suspect that we have imagined what we 
see, whereas here, though that suspicion may arise for a moment ,  
there remains such complete  certainty that the doubt  has no force. 
Here Teresa makes no appeal at all to additional signs as a means of  
confirmation. Instead she talks of  something impressed upon  the 
understanding in the vision itself, and o f  a clear knowledge deeply 
engraven on her soul, so that  doubt  seems quite impossible. And 
then she makes a comparison, especially interesting in connection 
with Locke's  demand. She says that "one can no more doubt  it than 
one can doubt  the evidence o f  one's eyes - indeed the latter is easier, 
for we sometimes suspect that we have imagined what we see ..." 
Now, Locke demanded signs which were such that reason could 
not  be mistaken in them. But both  Gideon and Teresa knew that 
sense perception does not  provide signs of  that kind. One can, o f  
course, strengthen such an appeal by an iteration of  signs, as Gideon 
did. But a human life cannot encompass an inf'mite series of  such 
iterations. If  there is to be a human intellectual life at all, whether on 
the basis of  divine revelations or in terms of  some more "natural"  
knowledge, that iteration must somewhere come to an end. Where 
does it end? 
Teresa, it seems to me, is pret ty clear in answering that question for 
herself. Some of her enthusiastic experiences seemed to her to be the 
most solid elements in her intellectual life, more deeply engraven on 
her understanding and less open to doubt  than any sense perception. 
We might say that Teresa represents the recognition of  a genuine en- 
thusiasm, in some instances at least, as a basic intellectual act, an act 
which is done not by means of  doing some other  act. It is a recognition 
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which does not  stem f rom the application of  a criterion or rule. The 
necessity of  there being such basic intellectual acts seems to be parallel 
to that o f  basic physical acts - it is essentially due, in both  cases, to 
the impossibility o f  an infinite iteration. Do we have some a priori  
reason for supposing that Teresa cannot be right in thinking that, 
in her  o w n  case, the recognition o f  the divine presence and communi- 
cation is basic in that  way? I do not  have such a reason. 
Let me reiterate that here we are dealing with the possibility of  a 
genuine divine communication.  Of course, if there is no God at all, or 
if God is either unable or unwilling to communicate  with human 
beings, then there is no such thing as a genuine enthusiasm. But if 
there is a God after all, and if He is able and willing to reveal Himself, 
then it seems (to me, at least) not at all incredible that He should give 
Teresa a power  of  recognizing His presence. I s  that more incredible 
than that He should have given Gideon a power  of  telling the differ- 
ence between a wet sheepskin and a dry one? Or, should we say, be- 
tween the feel o f  wet  and the feel of  dry? 
William James says somewhere, if I remember  correctly, that the 
religious form of  every question is the most  profound form. Perhaps 
that is true. If  it is true, that is probably because those questions 
which really do have a religious form are not  merely matters o f  curiosi- 
ty, not merely "theoret ical ."  They are the questions which touch our 
own deepest roots, and the bases on which our lives are built. Do we 
choose the answers to such questions? Sometimes it seems so. But 
perhaps more often (as, I think, with Teresa) we seem to be gripped by 
something which is stronger than anything else in our experience. We 
may feel like saying, not  that we have chosen an answer, but  rather 
that an answer has chosen us. The enthusiasts, or some of  them at 
any rate, are of ten in that situation. But perhaps they are not  so much 
unlike the person who finds himself gripped by the power  of  sense 
perception, or by  the lucidity of  some principle of  logic. Argument 
cannot do everything, because it must begin with something. Perhaps 
no one can do bet ter  than to cast in his own lot, and his own life, with 
whatever he has found to be most  compelling in his own experience. 
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